Defining Waqf: Concept, Purpose, and Significance in India
Waqf, an institution deeply rooted in Islamic law and tradition, signifies the permanent dedication of movable or immovable property by an individual for purposes recognized as pious, religious, or charitable.1 The term itself, derived from the Arabic root ‘Waqafa’ meaning ‘to detain’ or ‘hold’, reflects the core principle: once a property is declared Waqf, its ownership is irrevocably transferred from the dedicator (Waqif) and vested perpetually in God (Allah).4 This divine ownership renders the property inalienable – it cannot be sold, gifted, or inherited.5 The management and administration of the Waqf property are typically entrusted to a ‘Mutawalli’ (custodian or manager), appointed either by the Waqif or a competent authority, to ensure the `usufruct (benefit)’ (benefits derived from the property) is utilized according to the Waqif’s stated intentions.1
The intended purposes of Waqf are broad, encompassing the establishment and maintenance of mosques, graveyards (qabristans), shrines (dargahs), educational institutions (madrasas), healthcare facilities, and providing financial support to the poor, orphans, widows, and disabled persons within the Muslim community.2 This makes Waqf a significant socio-religious institution with considerable economic potential for community welfare.
n India, the scale of Waqf properties is immense. Waqf Boards are often cited as the third-largest landholder in the country, surpassed only by the Armed Forces and Indian Railways.17 As of early 2025, government data indicated approximately 8.72 lakh immovable Waqf properties registered nationwide, spanning over 9.4 lakh acres.14 The Sachar Committee Report in 2006 estimated the book value of around 4.9 lakh registered properties at ₹60 billion (Rs 6,000 crore) and projected a potential annual income of ₹120 billion (Rs 12,000 crore) if managed efficiently.14 However, the actual income generated has been reported as significantly lower, often cited around ₹1.63 billion (Rs 163 crore) annually around the time of the Sachar report, representing a meagre rate of return.14 This stark contrast between the vast potential value of Waqf assets and their low income generation has become a central argument for proponents advocating administrative reform, framing the issue primarily as one of chronic mismanagement hindering the socio-economic development of the Muslim community.3 The argument posits that unlocking this economic potential through better governance is crucial for fulfilling the charitable objectives of Waqf.
Legislative Context: Overview of Waqf Act 1995, 2013 Amendment, and the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025
The administration of Waqf properties in India has been subject to state regulation for over a century, reflecting an ongoing effort to balance the religious and charitable nature of the institution with governmental oversight for efficiency and accountability. Early legislation during British rule, such as the Mussalman Waqf Validating Act, 1913, and the Mussalman Wakf Act, 1923, laid the groundwork.1 Post-independence, the Wakf Act, 1954, aimed to centralize management by establishing State Waqf Boards (SWBs) and, later in 1964, the Central Wakf Council (CWC) as a supervisory body.1
The Wakf Act, 1995, repealed the 1954 Act and provided a more comprehensive framework, defining the powers and functions of the CWC, SWBs, Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), and Mutawallis.1 It mandated surveys of Waqf properties, established Waqf Tribunals for dispute resolution, and regulated the alienation (transfer) of Waqf property.1
Significant changes were introduced by the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2013, passed during the Congress-led UPA government. Key amendments included a clearer definition of ‘encroacher’, recognition of ‘Waqf by user’ (where long-term use establishes Waqf status), setting timelines for surveys, expanding the Tribunal’s composition, prohibiting the sale or gifting of Waqf properties (Section 104A), increasing the maximum lease period for commercial purposes from 3 to 30 years, mandating the inclusion of women members on Waqf Boards, and empowering the CWC to issue directives to SWBs.1 Section 108A was also added, giving the Wakf Act overriding effect over other laws in case of inconsistencies.41 While welcomed by some at the time 41, the 2013 amendments later faced criticism from the subsequent NDA government, which characterized them as “extreme,” an “appeasement” exercise that granted “unlimited powers” to Waqf Boards and allegedly allowed non-Muslims to create Waqf, thereby necessitating further reform.6
This led to the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025 (initially introduced as a Bill in 2024 and passed by Parliament in April 2025).3 The stated objectives of the 2025 Act are manifold: to redress issues and shortcomings of the previous Acts, improve administration and management efficiency, enhance transparency and accountability, reduce legal disputes, modernize management through technology, and ensure Waqf properties are used for their intended purpose.1 The Act was also renamed the ‘Unified Waqf Management, Empowerment, Efficiency and Development Act, 1995’ (UWMEEDA).20 This legislative history underscores a persistent tension between preserving Waqf’s unique religious character and the state’s drive towards standardized regulation, with each amendment recalibrating this balance in response to perceived administrative failures or political considerations.
II. The Waqf Framework in India: History and Structure
Historical Evolution of Waqf Law and Administration
The concept of Waqf, while rooted in early Islamic jurisprudence and practices attributed to the Prophet Muhammad and his companions 5, gained institutional prominence in India with the advent of Islamic rule during the Delhi Sultanate (13th-16th centuries).12 Rulers like Sultan Muizuddin Sam Ghaor, Iltutmish, Muhammad bin Tughlaq, and Firoz Shah Tughlaq endowed properties for mosques, madrasas, and other public amenities, establishing a system where Waqf management was, in theory, centrally controlled under the monarch.34
The British colonial period brought significant changes. While early regulations like the Bengal Regulation XIX of 1810 allowed government oversight 32, the late 19th century saw legal challenges, including a Privy Council view questioning the validity of certain Waqfs.4 This led to legislative responses from the Muslim community and the colonial government, culminating in the Mussalman Wakf Validating Act, 1913, which aimed to preserve the institution, and the Mussalman Wakf Act, 1923, which focused on administration and reporting.1 However, concerns about mismanagement persisted. A 1932 report by the Muslim Public and Charitable Wakf Committee, appointed by the then British regime, for the United Provinces highlighted widespread issues like illegal sale/mortgage of Waqf properties, misuse of income by Mutawallis, falsification of accounts, and the failure of the 1923 Act due to lack of enforcement – problems echoed by prominent legal figures of the time.32
After India’s independence, the government sought to consolidate and improve Waqf administration. The Wakf Act, 1954, represented a major step towards centralization, establishing State Wakf Boards (SWBs) for the first time to oversee Waqf properties within their respective jurisdictions.1 The Act also led to the creation of the Central Wakf Council (CWC) in 1964, intended as a statutory body to advise the central government and supervise the functioning of the SWBs.1 This marked a definitive shift towards a more formalized, state-regulated system for managing these religious endowments.
III. The Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025: Analysis of Key
Provisions
Stated Objectives: Transparency, Efficiency, Accountability
The Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025, was presented by the government as a necessary measure to overhaul the existing framework governing Waqf properties in India. Its stated objectives centered on addressing perceived shortcomings in the Wakf Act, 1995 (as amended in 2013) and improving the overall administration and management of Waqf assets.1 Key goals articulated by proponents included enhancing the efficiency of Waqf Boards, increasing transparency in their operations, ensuring greater accountability from Mutawallis and board members, modernizing management practices through the use of technology (digitization), reducing the volume of legal disputes, and clarifying ambiguities in the law.1 The renaming of the principal Act to the ‘Unified Waqf Management, Empowerment, Efficiency and Development Act, 1995’ (UWMEEDA) was intended to reflect these ambitious reformist goals.20
Changes in Waqf Formation and Definition
The 2025 Act introduced significant modifications to the very definition and process of creating a Waqf:
1. ‘Practicing Muslim’ Clause: A major change restricts the ability to create a Waqf. Section 3(r) was amended to state that only a person “showing or demonstrating that he is practising Islam for at least five years” can dedicate property as Waqf.2 This was framed as restoring the pre-2013 position 39, countering the interpretation that the 2013 amendment allowed “any person,” including non-Muslims, to create Waqf.14 This amendment has been brought as cases were reported in which non-Muslim citizens had donated their properties as Waqf.
2. Ownership Requirement: The Act explicitly mandates that the Waqif (donor) must be the lawful owner of the property being dedicated and competent to transfer it.2 This provision aims to prevent fraudulent dedications of properties not actually owned by the donor.44
3. Removal of ‘Waqf by User’: The concept of “Waqf by user,” where property could be recognized as Waqf based on long-standing use for religious or charitable purposes even without a formal deed, was removed or significantly curtailed.2 This became one of the most contentious amendments, as critics argued that a vast number of existing Waqfs, particularly older mosques, dargahs, and graveyards established before modern documentation practices, rely on this principle.3 The government argued this provision led to wrongful classification of properties, including government assets.44 The final Act included a provision stating that existing registered Waqf by user properties would remain Waqf, unless disputed or identified as government property.59
4. Waqf-alal-aulad (Family Waqf): The Act clarifies that the creation of a family Waqf must not result in the denial of inheritance rights to the Waqif’s heirs, specifically including women heirs.2 This was presented as a measure promoting gender equality.52 Additionally, provisions were inserted allowing for the income to be used for the maintenance of widows, divorced women, and orphans if the Waqif so intended.39
5. New Definitions: The Act introduced formal definitions for specific types of Waqf (Aghakhani Waqf, Bohra Waqf) and key administrative terms like “Collector,” “Government Organisation,” “Government property,” and “portal and database”.41 The possibility of creating a Mutawalli verbally was removed by omitting the relevant words in Section 3(i).59
Survey, Determination, and Management of Waqf Properties
The 2025 Act significantly altered the procedures for surveying, identifying, and managing Waqf properties, shifting power away from the Waqf Boards towards state administrative machinery:
1. Collector’s Role in Survey: The Act replaced the previously appointed Survey Commissioner with the District Collector (or an authorized officer not below Deputy Collector rank) as the authority responsible for conducting surveys of Waqf properties.2 Surveys pending at the commencement of the Act were to be transferred to the Collector and completed according to the state’s revenue laws.38 This change aimed to integrate Waqf surveys with standard land record management practices.67
2. Repeal of Section 40 (Board’s Power to Determine): The power vested in the Waqf Board under Section 40 of the 1995 Act to inquire and determine whether a property is Waqf property was removed.39 The government justified this major shift by citing widespread misuse of this power by vested interests and corrupt officials to illegitimately acquire properties, including private and government land.54
3. Government Property Status Determination: The Act explicitly states that any property belonging to a Government Organisation, even if identified or declared as Waqf, will cease to be considered Waqf property.2 In cases of dispute or uncertainty regarding ownership between Waqf and government claims, the District Collector is empowered to investigate, determine the ownership, and submit a report to the state government. If deemed government property, the Collector will update the revenue records accordingly.2
4 .Centralized Portal and Database: The Act mandates the creation and use of a central digital “portal and database” (such as the existing Waqf Assets Management System of India – WAMSI) for the registration, accounts, audit, and other details of all Waqf properties and Boards.30 All existing Waqfs registered prior to the Act were required to file their details on this portal within six months of the Act’s commencement.14 This initiative aims to enhance transparency, ensure accurate record-keeping, and facilitate better monitoring and management.30
5. Mutation Procedures: The Act provides for a detailed procedure for mutation (updating land records) to be followed as per state revenue laws, requiring due notice to all concerned parties before any property is officially recorded as Waqf property.
These changes collectively signify a move towards standardizing Waqf property administration within the general framework of state land revenue systems and administrative control, reducing the specialized role previously held by the Waqf Boards and Survey Commissioners.
Restructuring Waqf Boards and Central Council
The composition and functioning of both the State Waqf Boards (SWBs) and the Central Wakf Council (CWC) underwent significant restructuring under the 2025 Act, introducing elements of external oversight and broader representation:
1. Inclusion of Non-Muslim Members: Perhaps the most debated change was the mandatory inclusion of two non-Muslim members in both the CWC and each SWB.2 Additionally, the requirement for certain categories of appointed members on the CWC (MPs, former judges, eminent persons) to be Muslim was removed.2 The government justified this as promoting inclusivity, transparency, and providing administrative oversight, arguing that non-Muslim members would only monitor administrative and legal compliance, not interfere in religious matters.3
2. Nomination Replaces Election for SWBs: The process of electing members to SWBs from electoral colleges of Muslim MPs, MLAs/MLCs, and Bar Council members was abolished. Instead, the Act empowers the State Government to nominate one person from each of these categories, and these nominees are not required to be Muslim.2 Effectively, all members of the SWBs are now nominated by the government 2, a move seen as significantly increasing state control over the boards’ composition.6
3. Representation for Diverse Muslim Groups: The Act mandates that SWBs must include at least one member each from Shia, Sunni, and “other backward classes among Muslim communities”.2 Representation for Bohra and Aghakhani communities is also mandated if they have functional Waqfs in the state/UT.38 The revised CWC composition also includes representatives from Muslim organizations and scholars.59 This was presented as an effort to make the boards more reflective of the internal diversity of the Muslim population.78
4. Women’s Representation: The Act specifies that two Muslim members on SWBs 2 and two women members on the CWC must be women.38. This has been framed as promoting gender equality 52.
5. CEO Qualification: The requirement for the CEO of an SWB to be a Muslim was removed, although the appointment process itself was retained.41 There were indications the minimum rank requirement might have been raised to Joint Secretary level.78
6. Separate Boards for Sects: The Act explicitly allows for the establishment of separate Waqf Boards for Bohra and Aghakhani communities, in addition to the existing provision for separate Shia and Sunni boards based on property thresholds.38
These structural changes reflect an attempt to diversify the composition of Waqf governing bodies, both internally among Muslim groups and externally by including non-Muslims, while simultaneously centralizing the appointment process under government nomination.
Changes to Waqf Tribunals and Legal Processes
The 2025 Act also significantly modified the structure and functioning of Waqf Tribunals and related legal procedures:
1. Tribunal Composition: The Act altered the composition of the three-member Waqf Tribunals established under Section 83 of the 1995 Act. It removed the requirement for one member to be a person having knowledge of Muslim law and jurisprudence.2 The new composition mandates: (i) a current or former District Judge as Chairperson, and (ii) a current or former officer of the rank equivalent to Joint Secretary to the State Government as the other member..259
2. Appealability of Tribunal Decisions: The Act removed the provision (Section 83(7) amendment, Section 83(9) substitution) that previously deemed Tribunal decisions “final”.2 It explicitly allows any person aggrieved by a Tribunal order to appeal to the High Court within 90 days of receiving the order.2 This was presented as a positive step towards enhancing judicial oversight and ensuring fairness.53
3. Applicability of Limitation Act, 1963: Section 107 of the 1995 Act, which barred the application of the Limitation Act, 1963 to suits for possession of immovable Waqf property, was substituted.59 The new Section 107 explicitly states that the Limitation Act, 1963 shall apply to proceedings related to claims or interests pertaining to immovable Waqf property.14 This means the standard time limits (typically 12 years for adverse possession) for initiating legal action to recover property now apply to Waqf properties. Critics argued this is a devastating blow to efforts to reclaim encroached Waqf lands, as it could effectively legitimize long-standing illegal occupation and extinguish the Wakf Board’s right to recover such properties after the limitation period expires.39 Section 108 (Evacuee property) and 108A (Overriding effect) were also omitted.52
4. Audit Requirements: The Act amended Section 47 regarding audits.59 Annual audits became mandatory for Waqfs with a net annual income exceeding Rs 1 lakh (up from Rs 50,000), conducted by auditors appointed by the Board from a State Government-approved panel.59 Crucially, the Act empowers the Central Government to order an audit of any Waqf at any time, to be conducted either by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) or another designated officer.20 The audit reports must be published by the Board.59 These measures aim to significantly enhance financial scrutiny and discipline.30
5. Penalties: The Act introduced stricter penalties for Mutawallis who fail to perform their duties, such as maintaining accounts, allowing inspections, or providing required information.30
The cumulative effect of these amendments suggests a fundamental restructuring of the Waqf governance landscape in India. The shift towards integrating Waqf administration into the standard state machinery—through the Collector’s enhanced role, the application of general laws like the Limitation Act, and standardized audit procedures—moves away from the previously more distinct, community-centric (though state-regulated) model. This standardisation, while potentially offering benefits in terms of efficiency and integration with broader land management systems, also raises critical questions about the preservation of Waqf’s unique religious and legal identity.
IV. Allegations of Corruption and Mismanagement
Historical and Contemporary Evidence
Concerns regarding the mismanagement and misuse of Waqf properties are not a recent phenomenon but have historical roots extending back to the colonial era. The 1932 report of the Muslim Public and Charitable Waqf Committee for the United Provinces provided scathing evidence of widespread corruption and malpractice even then. Issues identified included the illegal sale and mortgage of Waqf properties by Mutawallis, misuse of income for personal expenses instead of charitable purposes, falsification of accounts, and the general failure of earlier regulatory attempts like the Mussalman Waqf Act of 1923 due to weak enforcement.32
These historical concerns found resonance in contemporary reports and investigations. The landmark Sachar Committee Report (2006), while examining the socio-economic status of Muslims, highlighted significant problems with Waqf administration.3 It noted the extremely low rate of return (around 2.7%) from Waqf properties compared to their potential value, attributing this partly to mismanagement, widespread encroachment (estimated at 7% of registered properties, with 50% having unknown status), poor maintenance, inadequate staffing, and lack of technical expertise within Waqf Boards.14 The report estimated a potential annual income of Rs 12,000 crore, starkly contrasting with the actual Rs 163 crore being generated then, suggesting vast resources meant for community welfare were being lost or underutilised.14
Subsequent reports, including those by the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Waqf (e.g., 2008 report), also pointed to administrative inefficiencies and recommended reforms.24
While specific Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) reports focusing solely on Waqf Boards across India were not detailed in the provided materials, the 2025 Act’s provision for potential CAG audits 59 reflects an acknowledgment of the need for high-level financial scrutiny, similar to other government bodies audited by the CAG.97 One snippet mentioned a planned or undertaken audit of the Haryana Wakf Board.101
Numerous investigative reports and news articles corroborate these findings with specific instances of alleged corruption and encroachment across various states:
[+] Encroachment: Reports detail illegal occupation of Waqf land, including graveyards, dargah lands, and even properties claimed by government agencies like ASI, DDA, and L&DO.18 High-profile claims involved properties like Mukesh Ambani’s Antilia, islands in Bet Dwarka, and Lutyens Zone properties in Delhi.43 Government figures cited 58,929 encroached properties nationally 105 and 994 illegally alienated properties.104 In Karnataka, 29,000 acres were reported as encroached 106, while in Chhattisgarh, 90% of Waqf land was allegedly illegally occupied.86 A significant number of properties (over 73,000) are reportedly under dispute.21
[+] Illegal Sales/Leases: Cases involve Waqf officials or trustees illegally selling or leasing land, sometimes at nominal rates fixed decades ago, to builders or private entities, often allegedly in collusion with land mafias or politicians.18 Examples include a Rs 2 lakh crore scam involving 22,000 acres in Karnataka allegedly implicating Congress leaders 102, a Rs 2,500 crore scam in Mumbai involving underworld figures and politicians 102, and the demolition of a Shia Imambara in Prayagraj replaced by a commercial complex allegedly involving politician Atiq Ahmed.102
[+] Financial Irregularities: Allegations include embezzlement of funds, misappropriation of compensation money, arbitrary rent decisions causing losses, bribery, and failure to maintain proper accounts.32
[+] Administrative Failures: Issues include non-completion of surveys, lack of digitization and poor record-keeping (records missing for over 50% of properties 27), delays in dispute resolution (over 40,000 cases pending in tribunals 24, rising litigation 18), and threats against surveyors or activists exposing wrongdoing.86
The persistence of these issues across decades, documented by various committees and reports, suggests systemic weaknesses within the Waqf administration framework prior to the 2025 Act. The problem appears multifaceted, involving not only potential corruption or incompetence within Waqf Boards and among Mutawallis but also external pressures from land mafias, political interference 27, and encroachment by government bodies themselves.14 This complex web of internal and external factors contributed significantly to the narrative justifying the need for the comprehensive reforms introduced in 2025.
Analysis of the Act’s potential effectiveness in curbing corruption and improving accountability
The Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025 incorporates several provisions explicitly aimed at tackling the long-standing issues of corruption, mismanagement, and lack of transparency:
[+] Digitization and Transparency: The mandatory use of a central portal and database for registration, accounts, audits, and property details 39 is intended to create a transparent, accessible, and verifiable record of all Waqf assets and their management. This could potentially curb unauthorized transactions, illegal occupations, and fraudulent claims by making information publicly traceable.30
[+] Enhanced Audit Mechanisms: The provision for annual audits for larger Waqfs by state-panel auditors, coupled with the Central Government’s power to order a CAG audit for any Waqf at any time 59, introduces a significantly higher level of financial scrutiny. This aims to prevent financial mismanagement, ensure funds are used for intended welfare purposes, and promote financial discipline.39 Publication of audit reports further enhances accountability.59
[+] Strengthened Penalties: The introduction of stricter penalties for Mutawallis who fail in their duties 30 aims to create a stronger deterrent against negligence and malfeasance.
[+] Centralized Oversight and Standardized Procedures: Shifting survey responsibilities to the Collector under state revenue laws 2, removing the Board’s power under Section 40 39, and clarifying the status of government property 2 are intended to standardize procedures, reduce arbitrary decision-making by Boards, and prevent misuse of power for property grabbing.54
[+] External Oversight (Non-Muslim Members): The inclusion of non-Muslim members on boards and the council is presented partly as a measure to bring external perspectives and enhance administrative oversight.3
However, the potential effectiveness of these measures is subject to debate and depends heavily on implementation:
[+] Implementation Challenges: Past efforts at reform, including digitization drives, have reportedly faced challenges and failed to achieve desired outcomes.44 The success of the new portal and database depends on timely compliance, data accuracy, and effective monitoring.
[+] Shift vs. Solution: Critics question whether shifting powers from Waqf Boards to District Collectors genuinely solves the problem of corruption or merely relocates the potential for administrative bias or political influence.30 The effectiveness hinges on the integrity and capacity of the state administrative machinery.
[+] Unintended Consequences: Measures like the removal of ‘Waqf by user’ and the application of the Limitation Act, while potentially aimed at resolving disputes, could inadvertently legitimize past encroachments or lead to the loss of genuine Waqf properties lacking formal documentation, thereby protecting past illegalities rather than curbing them.39
[+] Focus of Oversight: It remains to be seen whether the inclusion of a limited number of non-Muslim members can effectively provide meaningful oversight into the complex and often opaque internal dealings of numerous Waqf properties.
While the government presents the Act as a necessary tool to combat corruption based on documented historical and contemporary evidence of mismanagement, the opposition and some community groups, while often acknowledging the existence of problems 22, argue that the chosen solutions are disproportionate. They contend that the emphasis on increased government control via the Collector and the inclusion of non-Muslim members might be driven by political motives aimed at undermining the community’s religious autonomy, rather than solely focusing on administrative reform.3 This frames the central conflict not just as a matter of good governance versus corruption, but also as a struggle over control and the definition of religious autonomy in a secular state.
V. Social Equity: Caste Dynamics and Pasmanda Muslims
Social Stratification within Indian Muslims: The Pasmanda Context
While Islam doctrinally emphasises equality among believers, the social reality within the Indian Muslim community is marked by significant stratification.111 This internal division is primarily understood through the categories of ‘Ashraf’ and ‘Pasmanda’.
‘Ashraf’ (meaning ‘noble’) generally refers to Muslims who claim foreign ancestry (Arab, Persian, Turkic, Afghan) or belong to traditionally dominant groups. They are often considered the elite or upper castes within the community.111
‘Pasmanda’ (a Persian term meaning ‘those left behind’) is an umbrella category encompassing the vast majority (estimates range from 75% to over 90%) of Indian Muslims.83 This group includes ‘Ajlaf’ (considered lower status, comprising mainly artisan and occupational groups, largely corresponding to OBCs) and ‘Arzal’ (considered the lowest, involved in ‘unclean’ occupations, analogous to Dalits), as well as tribal Muslim communities.111 These communities often consist of indigenous converts from lower Hindu castes who retained their occupational identities and faced continued social discrimination even after conversion.111
Despite theological assertions of castelessness, Pasmanda activists and scholars point to pervasive discriminatory practices perpetuated by Ashraf sections, including social exclusion, discouragement of inter-caste marriage (endogamy), separate burial grounds, ridicule of cultural practices and language, and denial of equal status in social and religious spheres.111 Several government-appointed commissions, including the Kaka Kalelkar Commission, Mandal Commission, Ranganath Mishra Commission, and the Sachar Committee, have acknowledged the existence of caste-like discrimination and socio-economic backwardness among specific Muslim groups.113 Pasmanda Muslims thus face a form of dual discrimination: from the state and wider society as part of a religious minority, and internally from dominant Ashraf groups within their own community.112
Alleged Discrimination in Waqf Administration and Benefit Distribution
A significant grievance raised by Pasmanda movements relates to their alleged exclusion from the benefits and management of Waqf resources. It is argued that Waqf Boards and associated institutions are largely dominated by Ashraf elites, who control vast properties originally intended for the welfare of the entire community, particularly the poor.75 This elite capture allegedly results in Pasmanda Muslims being denied their rightful share of benefits and representation in decision-making bodies.111
A stark example cited is the denial of burial rights to Pasmanda Muslims in Waqf Board-controlled cemeteries in some areas, forcing them to seek separate or distant burial grounds, even while government-controlled cemeteries might be open to all Muslims.111 This practice highlights the persistence of caste-based segregation enforced through institutions ostensibly meant to serve the entire community.111 Furthermore, the pervasive mismanagement and corruption within Waqf Boards are seen as disproportionately harming the poorest sections of the Muslim community, who are predominantly Pasmanda and rely most on the charitable support Waqf endowments are supposed to provide.13 When resources are siphoned off or properties lie dormant due to encroachment or neglect, it is the intended beneficiaries—the poor and marginalized—who suffer the most.
The 2025 Act’s Provisions on Representation and Equality: Potential Impact on Pasmanda Muslims
The Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025, contains specific provisions that proponents claim will address issues of social equity and benefit marginalized sections, including Pasmanda Muslims:
1. Representation for Backward Classes: The Act explicitly mandates the nomination of at least one member from “other backward classes among Muslim communities” to each State Wakf Board.2 This marks a significant legal recognition of internal stratification and aims to ensure Pasmanda representation in governance structures previously alleged to be Ashraf-dominated.
2. Transparency and Welfare Focus: Provisions aimed at curbing corruption, ensuring financial accountability through audits, digitizing records, and ensuring funds are used for welfare purposes 28 could, if implemented effectively, lead to greater resources being available for the socio-economic upliftment of poor Muslims, who are largely Pasmanda.
3. Protection of Women’s Rights: The clarification that Waqf-alal-aulad cannot deny inheritance rights to women heirs 2 and the specific mention of potential maintenance for widows, divorced women, and orphans 39 are framed as measures benefiting vulnerable groups, potentially including many Pasmanda women.
The government actively promoted that the Act would specifically benefit Pasmanda Muslims by breaking the hold of elites and ensuring resources reach the intended beneficiaries.13 Prime Minister Modi himself stated that the reforms were triggered partly by letters from Muslim widows and that the Act would benefit poor and Pasmanda Muslims.50 This framing attempts to position the state intervention as an act of social justice within the Muslim community, countering claims that the Act is broadly anti-Muslim.
Perspectives from Pasmanda Organisations
The response from Pasmanda organizations and leaders to the 2025 Act has been varied, reflecting internal diversity of opinion and political alignment:
Engagement and Support: The All India Pasmanda Muslim Mahaz (AIPMM), a prominent organization, actively engaged with the Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) reviewing the Bill, submitting specific suggestions for reform. These included introducing an appellate system, improving record management, imposing stricter penalties for encroachment, disqualifying corrupt board members, ensuring proper revenue utilization, and empowering revenue officials for fair inquiries.53 This engagement suggests a willingness to work within the proposed framework to achieve desired reforms. Some Pasmanda voices publicly supported the Bill, echoing the government’s aim that it would benefit the poor and marginalised by curbing elite corruption and ensuring transparency.13 JPC Chairman Jagdambika Pal specifically highlighted the expected benefits for Pasmandas.57
Criticism and Skepticism: However, other significant Pasmanda voices expressed strong opposition. Ali Anwar Ansari, founder of the Pasmanda Muslim Mahaz (PMM), criticized the Act, arguing that its true intention was not Pasmanda welfare but rather to facilitate state control over Waqf lands for the benefit of large businesses and corporate houses, potentially displacing poor Muslim traders operating on Waqf properties.83 He claimed the amendments were designed to establish state dominance and that 99% of Pasmanda Muslims opposed the Bill.83
VI. Political and Constitutional Dimensions
The NDA government consistently framed the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025, as a necessary and overdue reform measure aimed at administrative improvement rather than religious interference. The core justifications revolved around tackling deep-seated issues of corruption, mismanagement, and illegal encroachment that allegedly plagued the Waqf system for decades, preventing valuable resources from reaching the intended beneficiaries, particularly poor Muslims.3 Enhancing transparency, efficiency, and accountability through measures like digitization, stricter audits, and standardized procedures was presented as the primary objective.1
Home Minister Amit Shah repeatedly asserted that the 2013 law was “extreme,” passed for “appeasement,” and granted “unlimited powers” to Waqf Boards, necessitating the corrective measures in the 2025 Act.41 Minority Affairs Minister Kiren Rijiju echoed this, calling the 2013 changes “questionable” and a “constitutional fraud,” and claiming the repeal of the “draconian” Section 40 (Board’s power to determine Waqf property) was essential.69 Rijiju suggested that without the 2025 reform, even the Parliament building could have been claimed as Waqf property.4
Addressing criticisms about interference in religious matters, both Shah and Rijiju insisted the Act deals purely with property management and administration, not religious practices.3 Shah clarified that the inclusion of non-Muslim members on boards was solely for administrative oversight – to monitor legal compliance and proper use of funds – and did not entail involvement in religious activities.3 He framed Waqf administration as akin to managing a charitable trust, a task with significant secular components.43 The government also emphasized the Act’s provisions for inclusivity, such as representation for women and various Muslim sects including Pasmandas, presenting it as beneficial for marginalized groups within the community.13 Opposition claims were dismissed as fear-mongering for vote-bank politics.3
Critiques from the Indian National Congress and Other Opposition Parties
The Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025 faced unified and vociferous opposition from the Indian National Congress and other parties constituting the INDIA bloc, as well as several other regional parties and Muslim organizations. Their criticisms spanned constitutional, legal, political, and social grounds.
The most fundamental objection was that the Act is unconstitutional, violating multiple fundamental rights guaranteed to minorities and citizens.3 Specifically, violations of Article 14 (Equality before Law), Article 15 (Prohibition of Discrimination), Article 21 (Protection of Life and Personal Liberty), Article 25 (Freedom of Religion), Article 26 (Freedom to manage religious affairs), Article 29 (Protection of interests of minorities), and Article 30 (Right of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions) were alleged.47
Opposition leaders consistently called the Bill as discriminatory and specifically targeted at marginalizing the Muslim community.3 Congress leader Rahul Gandhi termed it a “weapon aimed at marginalising Muslims and usurping their personal laws and property rights,” an “attack on the Constitution” that sets a precedent to target other communities later.3
Congress President Mallikarjun Kharge called it “unconstitutional and divisive” and designed to “harass minorities”.121 Congress MP Gaurav Gogoi described it as a “4D assault on the Constitution” – diluting, defaming, dividing, and disenfranchising minorities.68
A major line of criticism focused on the erosion of the autonomy of Waqf Boards and the increased government control.3 The inclusion of non-Muslim members 3 and the shift from election to nomination for board members 2 were seen as direct interference. The enhanced powers granted to the District Collector, particularly in determining property status and resolving disputes involving government land, were viewed as executive overreach bypassing judicial processes.20
Fears were repeatedly expressed that the Act would facilitate the seizure or “land grab” of Waqf properties, particularly through the removal of the ‘Waqf by user’ doctrine and the clarification regarding government property.3 Opposition MPs highlighted the practical impossibility of producing centuries-old documents for many historic mosques and graveyards.29
The process followed by the Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) was also heavily criticized. Opposition members alleged that their amendments were rejected wholesale, their dissent notes initially omitted, and the proceedings were “bulldozed” without adequate discussion or consideration of stakeholder concerns.20
Specific parties and leaders voiced strong objections during parliamentary debates and outside. Besides Congress leaders, prominent critics included Asaduddin Owaisi (AIMIM) 6, Akhilesh Yadav (SP) 68, Mahua Moitra and Kalyan Banerjee (TMC) 45, Sanjay Singh (AAP) 79, A. Raja and T.R. Baalu (DMK) 81, Manoj Kumar Jha (RJD) 48, John Brittas (CPI-M) 45, among others. The opposition presented a united front in voting against the Bill 121 and subsequently announced plans to challenge its constitutionality in the Supreme Court.22
Constitutional Debate: Article 26 (Right to manage religious affairs) and Minority Rights
The core constitutional challenge raised against the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025, revolves around Article 26 of the Indian Constitution.2 Article 26 guarantees every religious denomination or any section thereof the right:
(a) to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes;
(b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion;
(c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and
(d) to administer such property in accordance with law.
Critics argue that several provisions of the 2025 Act infringe upon the rights guaranteed under Article 26(b) and (d) for the Muslim community concerning Waqf institutions. Key arguments include:
[+] Interference in Management: The mandatory inclusion of non-Muslim members in Waqf Boards and the CWC is seen as direct interference in the community’s right to manage its own religious and charitable institutions.2 The argument is that managing Waqf, rooted in Islamic principles, constitutes an “affair” that the community should manage itself, similar to how other religious endowments are governed.2
[+] Erosion of Autonomy: The shift from elected to nominated board members, the enhanced powers of the District Collector (an executive authority) in property determination and dispute resolution, and the removal of the Muslim law expert from the Tribunal are viewed as measures that significantly curtail the autonomy of Waqf institutions and subject them to excessive state control.4
[+] Alteration of Religious Practice: Changes to the definition of Waqf, such as the ‘practicing Muslim for five years’ clause and the removal of ‘Waqf by user’, are argued to interfere with established religious and customary practices related to creating and recognizing Waqf.71
Counter Arguments : The government contends that its regulations pertain to the secular aspects of administration and property management, which fall under Article 26(d)’s “in accordance with law” provision, allowing for state regulation.43 It argues that transparency and accountability in managing potentially vast public resources (in a broad sense, as they are for community benefit) necessitate state oversight. Furthermore, a 1995 Supreme Court judgment (Bramchari Vs West Bengal government) was cited by some commentators suggesting that Waqf Boards, being statutory bodies, may not strictly fall under the definition of a religious denomination protected by Article 26.61 The government’s assertion that non-Muslim members are purely for administrative oversight aims to deflect the charge of interference in “matters of religion” under Article 26(b).3 The resolution of this constitutional debate now rests with the Supreme Court.
Responses from Major Muslim Organizations (e.g., AIMPLB)
Leading Muslim organizations vehemently opposed the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025. The All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB), a prominent non-governmental body influential in matters of Muslim personal law, spearheaded the opposition. The AIMPLB consistently described the Bill/Act as “discriminatory,” “communally motivated,” a “blatant infringement” on constitutional rights, a “black law,” an “attack on religious freedom,” and “unconstitutional”.3
The AIMPLB’s specific objections mirrored those of the political opposition, focusing on:
[+] The erosion of Waqf Board autonomy through altered composition (inclusion of non-Muslims) and increased government control (Collector’s powers).3
[+] The perceived threat to Waqf properties through provisions empowering government seizure and the removal of ‘Waqf by user’.3
[+] The regressive nature of amendments regarding Waqf creation and management.74
[+] The lack of meaningful consultation with the Muslim community and stakeholders before introducing such significant changes.49
In response, the AIMPLB announced a multi-pronged strategy of resistance. They called for nationwide peaceful protests, including sit-ins, human chains, wearing black armbands during prayers (specifically urged for the last Friday of Ramzan), symbolic arrests, and submitting memoranda to authorities.3 They explicitly stated their intention to challenge the Act’s constitutionality in the Supreme Court 3 and sought an urgent appointment with the President to express concerns before she gave her assent.49 Other major organizations like Jamaat-e-Islami Hind 45, Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind 48, and Samastha Kerala Jamiathul Ulema 48 also filed petitions or issued statements condemning the Act as an assault on religious freedom and constitutional rights. This widespread and organized opposition from established Muslim bodies underscored the deep anxieties and perceived threats the Act generated within the community.
The highly polarized political landscape surrounding the 2025 Act, evident in the near party-line voting and the starkly contrasting narratives, reflects deeper ideological fissures in contemporary India regarding secularism, minority rights, and the role of the state in regulating religious institutions. The government successfully navigated the legislative process, leveraging the JPC mechanism to accommodate allied concerns while largely dismissing opposition objections, demonstrating effective floor and coalition management despite facing unified resistance.68 However, the immediate recourse to the Supreme Court by multiple opposition parties and Muslim organizations signifies that the political passage was merely the first stage, with the ultimate fate of the Act hinging on judicial review of its constitutional validity, particularly concerning Article 26.22
VII. Synthesis: Significance, Impacts, and Legal Challenges
Overall Significance of the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025
The Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025, represents a watershed moment in the legal and administrative history of Waqf in India. It fundamentally alters the governance structure, property determination processes, and legal framework surrounding these religiously endowed assets. Moving decisively away from the model established by the 1995 Act (and amplified by the 2013 amendments), the 2025 Act institutes a system characterized by significantly increased state oversight and integration with general administrative and legal machinery. Justified by the government as a necessary reform to combat decades of alleged corruption, mismanagement, and encroachment, and to enhance transparency and efficiency for community benefit, the Act has been simultaneously condemned by opposition parties and major Muslim organizations as an unconstitutional infringement on minority rights and religious autonomy. Its significance lies not only in the specific changes it introduces but also in its reflection of broader contemporary debates about secularism, state-minority relations, and the balance between regulation and religious freedom in India. The Act embodies a shift towards conceptualizing Waqf less as a purely internal religious matter under community control and more as a socio-legal entity with public dimensions subject to robust state regulation.43
Potential Consequences for Waqf Administration, Transparency, and Community Welfare
The potential impacts of the Act are multifaceted and highly contested, with plausible arguments supporting both positive and negative outcomes:
[+] Potential Positives: If implemented effectively and in good faith, the Act’s emphasis on digitization (central portal), mandatory audits (including CAG option), stricter penalties, and standardized survey/mutation procedures could lead to improved administrative efficiency, greater transparency in financial dealings, and a reduction in corruption and mismanagement.30 Clearer determination of property status (especially regarding government land) and the provision for High Court appeals might streamline dispute resolution.2 If successful, this could potentially unlock greater revenue from Waqf assets, allowing for enhanced investment in community welfare initiatives like education and healthcare, as envisioned by proponents and reports like Sachar.14
[+] Potential Negatives: Conversely, the Act carries significant risks. The erosion of Waqf Board autonomy and the increased power vested in executive authorities like the District Collector could lead to bureaucratic delays, potential bias, or politically motivated interference, replacing one set of problems with another.30 The removal of ‘Waqf by user’ and the application of the Limitation Act pose a serious threat to the status of numerous existing, undocumented Waqf properties and severely weaken the ability to recover historically encroached lands, potentially leading to a significant loss of assets.16 The inclusion of non-Muslim members, while intended for oversight, might dilute community control and create internal friction.3 There are fears that the focus could shift from the religious and charitable objectives of Waqf towards commercial exploitation or state appropriation of valuable land resources.58 Furthermore, the contentious nature of the Act and the perceived lack of community consultation could foster distrust and potentially discourage future donations to Waqf.58
The ultimate outcome remains highly uncertain, contingent not just on the letter of the law but on the manner of its implementation, the capacity and impartiality of the administrative bodies involved (including Collectors and restructured boards), and the interpretation provided by the judiciary in ongoing legal challenges.
Analysis of Impact on Muslim Minority Rights and Religious Autonomy
The central point of contention surrounding the 2025 Act is its perceived impact on the religious autonomy and constitutional rights of the Muslim minority. Critics argue that the Act constitutes a direct assault on the rights guaranteed under Article 26 of the Constitution, particularly the right of a religious denomination to manage its own affairs in matters of religion and administer its religious and charitable institutions.2
The inclusion of non-Muslims in Waqf governing bodies, the replacement of Muslim law experts in Tribunals with government officials, the enhanced powers of the District Collector, and the shift from elected to nominated board members are all seen as measures that fundamentally undermine the community’s ability to manage its own institutions according to its religious principles and traditions.2 The government’s counter-argument that these changes relate only to secular administrative aspects 43 is rejected by opponents who see Waqf management as intrinsically linked to religious purpose and community identity.
Beyond the specific legal arguments under Article 26, the Act has generated significant symbolic concern. In the current political climate, many within the Muslim community perceive the legislation as part of a broader pattern of state actions aimed at weakening minority institutions, eroding their rights, and asserting majoritarian dominance.3 The passage of the Act despite widespread opposition from the community and its representatives reinforces these fears of marginalization and disenfranchisement.68
Evaluation of Claims Regarding Equality for All Muslims
The government and proponents of the Act have highlighted its provisions for inclusivity, particularly the mandated representation for Backward Classes Muslims (Pasmandas), Shias, Sunnis, Bohras, Aghakhanis, and women on Waqf Boards.2 This is presented as a move towards ensuring internal equality within the Muslim community and addressing the long-standing grievances of marginalized groups like Pasmandas, who were allegedly excluded from the benefits and control of Waqf resources under the previous Ashraf-dominated system.13
However, the claim that the Act promotes equality for all Muslims is contested. While the representation clauses are acknowledged, critics argue that the potential negative impacts of the Act – such as the loss of properties due to the removal of ‘Waqf by user’ or the application of the Limitation Act, and the general reduction in institutional autonomy – could harm the entire community, including the marginalized sections it claims to help.83 Some Pasmanda leaders themselves have voiced skepticism, suggesting the government’s focus on internal divisions is a tactic to justify increased state control that ultimately benefits external interests (like corporations) rather than genuinely empowering backward Muslims.83 Therefore, while the Act introduces formal mechanisms for representing internal diversity, its overall impact on social equity within the Muslim community remains debatable, with concerns that potential gains in representation might be offset by broader institutional weakening or asset loss.
Ongoing and Potential Legal Challenges
The passage of the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025, immediately triggered legal action, with numerous petitions filed in the Supreme Court challenging its constitutional validity.48 Key petitioners include prominent political figures like Asaduddin Owaisi (AIMIM), Mohammad Jawed (Congress), Amanatullah Khan (AAP), and Manoj Kumar Jha (RJD), along with major religious organizations such as the AIMPLB, Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind, Samastha Kerala Jamiyyathul Ulema, and civil rights groups like the Association for Protection of Civil Rights.47 The Centre preemptively filed a caveat to ensure it is heard before any orders are passed.48
The grounds for challenge are extensive, primarily focusing on violations of fundamental rights under the Constitution, including:
[+] Articles 14 and 15 (Equality and Non-Discrimination): Alleging the Act discriminates against Muslims compared to how other religious endowments are treated.48
[+] Articles 25 and 26 (Religious Freedom and Autonomy): Arguing the Act interferes with the freedom to practice religion and the right of the religious denomination to manage its own affairs and institutions.48
[+] Articles 29 and 30 (Minority Rights): Claiming infringement on the cultural and educational rights of minorities.48
[+] Article 21 (Right to Life/Liberty) and Article 300A (Right to Property).48
Specific provisions under challenge include the inclusion of non-Muslims in governing bodies, the enhanced powers of the Collector, the removal of ‘Waqf by user’, the application of the Limitation Act, and the restructuring of Tribunals.48 The outcome of these legal challenges will be crucial in determining the final shape and implementation of the Act and will likely have significant implications for the interpretation of minority rights and the scope of state regulation of religious institutions in India. The specific targeting of the 2013 UPA amendments within the government’s justification for the 2025 Act 41 also adds a layer of political context, suggesting the reform is partly aimed at reversing the previous administration’s approach, making the legal and political stakes exceptionally high.
VIII. Conclusion and Recommendations
Summary of Key Findings and Contested Issues
The Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025, marks a significant and deeply contested overhaul of the legal and administrative framework governing Waqf properties in India. It introduces fundamental changes aimed at enhancing state oversight, standardizing procedures, and promoting transparency and accountability, driven by long-standing concerns and documented evidence of mismanagement, corruption, and encroachment within the Waqf system. Key changes include restructuring Waqf Boards and the Central Waqf Council to include non-Muslim members and representatives from diverse Muslim groups (including Backward Classes), replacing election with nomination for board appointments, empowering the District Collector in surveys and property determination (especially concerning government land), removing the Board’s power under the erstwhile Section 40, repealing the ‘Waqf by user’ doctrine prospectively, applying the Limitation Act, 1963 to Waqf properties, altering the composition of Waqf Tribunals, allowing appeals to the High Court, mandating digitization, and introducing stricter audit requirements, potentially including CAG audits.
The government justifies these reforms as essential for efficiency, curbing corruption, protecting public land, and ensuring that the benefits of Waqf reach the intended beneficiaries, particularly poor and marginalised Muslims like Pasmandas. However, the Act has faced unified opposition from major political parties (led by the Indian National Congress) and prominent Muslim organizations (like the AIMPLB). They argue the Act is unconstitutional, discriminatory, undermines the religious autonomy guaranteed under Article 26, facilitates government overreach and potential property seizure, and was pushed through without adequate consultation. The core contested issues revolve around the balance between state regulation and religious freedom, the impact on existing Waqf properties (especially undocumented ones), the role of non-Muslims in managing Muslim endowments, the extensive powers granted to the executive (Collector), and whether the Act genuinely promotes internal equality or serves a divisive political agenda.
Concluding Analysis on the Balance between Reform and Rights
The Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025, attempts to navigate the complex interface between the need for administrative reform of a large, historically mismanaged pool of charitable assets and the constitutional protection afforded to religious minorities to manage their own affairs. The evidence of mismanagement and the potential for community benefit if resources were properly utilized provide a compelling rationale for reform. Provisions aimed at transparency, digitization, and accountability align with principles of good governance.
However, the specific mechanisms chosen by the Act, particularly the significant enhancement of state/executive control (Collector’s role, nomination process) and the inclusion of non-Muslims in governing bodies, raise legitimate concerns about infringing upon the religious autonomy guaranteed by Article 26. The removal of ‘Waqf by user’ and the application of the Limitation Act, while potentially simplifying legal status, risk substantial loss of historical Waqf assets and may disproportionately affect properties serving poorer communities. The Act appears to prioritize administrative standardization and state oversight over community control and the unique religio-legal character of Waqf. Whether this recalibration strikes a constitutionally permissible balance or unduly encroaches upon minority rights is the central question now before the judiciary. The Act’s passage, despite strong opposition, signals the government’s determination to reshape the governance of minority institutions, reflecting a broader political and ideological shift in state-minority relations in India.
Recommendations for Policy and Practice
Given the contentious nature of the Act and the pending legal challenges, several steps could be considered to mitigate negative impacts and potentially foster a more constructive path forward:
1. Careful Rule-Making and Implementation Guidelines: The Central and State Governments, while framing rules under the Act, should prioritize clarity, fairness, and procedural safeguards. Specific guidelines for Collectors regarding property determination should emphasize objective evidence and due process, minimizing potential for bias or arbitrary action. Training programs for restructured boards, including non-Muslim members and representatives of diverse groups, should focus on understanding Waqf principles alongside administrative responsibilities.
2. Effective and Accessible Digitisation: Ensuring the mandated central portal is robust, user-friendly, accessible (including in regional languages), and actively maintained is crucial. Support mechanisms should be provided to assist smaller Waqfs or those in remote areas with the registration process within the stipulated timeframe. Transparency should be maximized by making relevant (non-sensitive) data publicly available.
3. Strengthening Internal Waqf Governance: Waqf Boards themselves should proactively adopt best practices in governance, financial management, and transparency, potentially drawing on recommendations from past committees (Sachar, JPC) or stakeholder groups like AIPMM.25 Professionalizing management, conducting regular internal audits, and establishing clear mechanisms for accountability can help rebuild trust and demonstrate effective self-regulation.
4. Building Trust through Dialogue: Given the significant trust deficit revealed during the Act’s passage, initiating structured and genuine dialogue between government authorities, Waqf stakeholders (including diverse community representatives like Pasmanda groups, Shia, Bohra, Aghakhani leaders), and legal experts could help address concerns and potentially refine implementation strategies. While political polarization makes this challenging, finding common ground on effective management for community benefit is essential.8
5. Judicial Clarity: The Supreme Court’s adjudication of the constitutional challenges is paramount. A clear and definitive ruling on the interpretation of Article 26 in the context of Waqf administration, the validity of specific provisions (like non-Muslim inclusion, Collector’s role, Limitation Act application), and the overall balance between state regulation and minority rights is necessary to resolve the legal uncertainty surrounding the Act.
The ultimate success of the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025, in achieving its stated objectives of efficient and transparent management for community welfare will depend not only on its legal survival but, more critically, on its impartial and effective implementation. Addressing the deep-seated issues of mismanagement requires more than legislative changes; it necessitates sustained administrative capacity, political will focused on genuine welfare rather than control, and a degree of trust between the state and the community – elements that appear fragile in the current context. The journey of Waqf reform in India is far from over, with its future trajectory likely to be shaped significantly by judicial interpretation and the realities of on-ground execution.
