The text centres around the Rs 3,000 crore INS Tabar, the then latest stealth frigate, that Cmdr PK Banerjee captained from December 2007 to end 2008 in operations against Red Sea pirates from October to December 2008.
Published by Banerjee 16 years after the described events, with an introduction by former Air Chief Marshal Raha, this book has many interesting features; it has tense descriptions of naval incidents, reveals shortcomings in command and among service personnel of senior rank, and the frustrations among those who have to follow arbitrary orders resulting from ‘malafide machinations’ and back-biting. On-shore establishment have a smoother career path than those on sea tenures despite making fewer sacrifices, since no weightage is given to those at sea.
Banerjee writes; ‘Nepotism and bigotry had not spared even the Armed Forces’; harsh rules provoke exodus of trained personnel. ‘The practice of keeping operational inadequacies hidden from higher authorities was the usual norm.’ Officers sought closeness with serving and retired seniors for career purposes. This is distressingly familiar; problem of favouritism and sycophancy exists in Indian civil services and presumably in our corporate sector as well; Banerjee’s views will resonate with all who are not self-employed. He observes, ‘If the crew does not react to the obnoxious and intemperate behaviour of some captains, it is simply out of respect for the rank.’
During his introductory call on the unnamed Western Commander in Chief, rather than receiving encouragement, Banerjee was received curtly and cryptically. A similar cold shoulder followed on a later occasion. Instead of Tabar’s expected sea exercise in January on the East Coast, she was directed out of turn and without preparation time to sea training at Kochi to which Captain Banerjee and crew looked forward with ‘an air of juvenile excitement mixed with trepidation’. The Commander in Chief had ‘misused his powers but the ship received plaudits after the training.
Armed pirates from militant-occupied Somalia were using small high-speed skiffs, sometimes from a ‘mother ship’, to board slower vessels and take hostages for ransom. Anti-pirate operations in the Gulf were a new venture for the IN. Tabar with a vintage single-engine Chetak helicopter with crew and machine gun, was the first ship deployed, at one day’s notice, from October 2008 and placed under Western Command without information on the ‘operational environment, logistics and administrative challenges’ and permission was denied to communicate with the nodal International Maritime Bureau Piracy Reporting Centre. Tabar was to operate independently for protection to Indian merchantmen in the security patrol area in the Gulf of Aden.
This mission presented Banerjee with multiple ethical dilemmas. Other nations’ warships acted selectively on the basis of race, religion and nationality, but not Tabar under Banerjee. Within a short time, a distress call was received ‘from an unknown vessel in need of fresh water’. Despite being delayed off course by two hours, Banerjee provided the Iranian fishing vessel with water, medicines and food as a moral obligation despite fear of subterfuge by pirates.
During the second patrol a distress signal was received from an hour astern. Despite the helicopter’s orders were to remain in visual contact with Tabar, Banerjee decided to launch the aircraft, whereupon the pirates fled. While the helicopter was still airborne, an Indian merchantman was attacked and again the pirates fled at its appearance. Banerjee then received an instruction from Mumbai to destroy skiffs without identification or inspection, which made no sense since many of the ‘pirate sightings’ turned out to be false. Two vessels painstakingly searched for one hour revealed no evidence of either fishing gear or catch which was suspicious but were let go. Tabar’s activities, without support from Mumbai, were lauded by many except by the C in C Mumbai, presumably due to defiance of orders that appeared promulgated for publicity and ‘inflated ego’.
The next challenge was a Somalia-bound trawler which switched off its identification system and its lights at night. Mumbai provided no assistance except urging Banerjee to destroy the ship. Despite slowing and adding to his vulnerability, Banerjee waited to be threatened and fired at, at which in retaliation, he sank the vessel. Two skiffs left the burning vessel, one of which was later found abandoned. This action was hugely appreciated, even finally by the C in C Mumbai and India’s Naval Chief (again unnamed) in New Delhi.
Tabar then refuelled at Djibouti despite it being a pirate centre – ‘warships were much safer at sea than being berthed in ports where security was questionable’. Another setback was when Tabar arrived at Salalah on its return journey, where no berth was available. It was able to secure the minimum time to refuel.
In early December 2008 Tabar was relieved by a IN destroyer. Returning to Mumbai, Banerjee found his supportive but unnamed Fleet Commander had been transferred. Tabar prepared for the Regatta on 24-27 December and came third despite a Goa visit for equipment trials and its long deployment abroad compared to its competitors in Mumbai that including a carrier with vastly more manpower. Banerjee was surprised to receive an instruction sent by post to hand over charge and move to Delhi. So he was denied the East Coast deployment. He was replaced on Tabar by an unnamed officer who maneuvered this assignment for career reasons. ‘Such things do happen, have happened in the past and will continue to happen in the future as well,’ Banerjee records philosophically.
Banerjee surmounted multiple challenges during the Mumbai posting. During all his commands, (the fourth being on Tabar) he had no injuries on board, though he admits to being ‘incredibly fortunate’. He set right a misfiring 100 mm gun, came alongside at Kochi despite insufficient draught, refueled at night on stormy seas, berthed at Djibouti without help from pilotage or Mumbai, and allowed his second-in-command to take Tabar out to sea to gain experience although the new Fleet Commander was aboard. His feedback resulted in a review of the antipirate transit corridor and provided greater safety to ships. He gave attention to detail like the number of kitchen staff and installed a suggestion box where anonymous notes could be posted.
It is a pity this book was not published earlier, when anti-piracy patrols were in the public eye. Names and ranks are never given, a needless discretion for a candid book. The use of epigraphs before each chapter and ‘points to ponder’ after each serve no purpose. Many maps and photographs are too indistinct to be useful. Frequent invocations of divine benediction add nothing to the narrative. Acronyms and military jargon are explained at the end of the book but remain challenging to any layperson. The actual number of crew on Tabar is nowhere specified, other than ‘more than 250’. A timeline is hard to construct; one given as an appendix would have been helpful.
Considering Banerjee had to contest internal rivalries and arbitrary orders, he required steady nerves and personal courage to perform his duty despite man-made obstacles. In these respects, Banerjee emerges with great credit. Therefore, a note on his career after 2008 was needed. Banerjee has narrated genuinely exciting incidents in a warship’s life. He highlights the importance of empathy and respect and attributes his success modestly to ‘be aware… and rational in proposals to seniors irrespective of the consequences…extensive training, careful planning, focus and commitment and care for men under command,’ and that technological advances require specialization and new learning every few years. This is a book of unexpected tension and an example of indomitable character.
